Military told NOT to read/download leak data…

Here’s the web page…


Now before everybody goes ballistic, this is actually correct for a COUPLE of reasons.

One, NIPR is a totally unclassified system, e.g NO classified of any kind allowed.  If you’ve looked at the Guardian article, the documents have a TS classification.  If Airman Shmukatelli were to go look at that page and pull up that document to look at it, he is effectively (even though the document is public on an unclassified server) committing a security violation.

Second,  if Airman Shmukatelli were to go look at that page and pull up that document to look at it and SAVE it to his drive, he is effectively (even though the document is public on an unclassified server) committing a more severe security violation, and if he sent it via NIPR to anyone, that ramps up to yet again ANOTHER level of security violation.

It does not matter whether the document is public or not, it is the classification level on the document that is viable and valid since that document has never been declassified by higher authority.

Actually, they are doing their folks a favor by preventing them from committing, however unwittingly, a security violation they would “legally” have to be prosecuted for.  Same as with the Manning/Wikileaks stuff…


Military told NOT to read/download leak data… — 15 Comments

  1. A gazillion years ago we did a lot of survey work on missile bases, positioning the silos. In the 80s, a security wonk came to get the originals. He redacted a lot of angles with black magic marker and took the originals. We were to retain copies, so we took shifts at the copier as he worked on the redaction. It was, of course, faster to leave the copier lid up and just slap sheet down, hit button, yank sheet out, repeat. And I noticed something. It’s against regulations to write survey observations in pencil. Pens leave a goodly imprint in paper. Every time the copier light flashed, the imprint of the redacted data showed through, clear as could be. If I had wanted…But I didn’t. I just laughed at their concept of security.

  2. PH- Yep, strange things happened with copiers then, and with Adobe now… But you ‘have’ to play by the rules, even if they make no sense…

    • Double redaction — it’s the only way to be sure. Basically, re-redact the copies. (In the case of Adobe Acrobat “redaction” [sic], that means actually truning it into a flat file — the Adobe soi disant redaction bars are a layer that can be lifted, last I checked. That’s not even really redaction. . . )

  3. The military runs on minutia — particularly the security side of things. I remember receiving blue channel traffic behind CNN during Gulf War 1. The blue channel info was TS/SI-TK/NOFORN/WNINTEL/ORCON/LIMDIS and wasn’t as accurate as CNN because the CNN feed was real time. I could comment on what I saw on television but to comment on the less accurate national security feed would have landed me in jail.

    Go figure. It’s rules.

  4. LL- LOL, yep I know ‘exactly’ what you’re talking about… Rules it is… Right, wrong or otherwise…

  5. If a PC that’s on NIPR touches anything classified, meaning either SIPR or JDIS… then it’s not necessarily a security violation. You can avoid the security violation by immediately pulling the ethernet cable and saying “Looks like we have a new SIPR (or JDIS) PC in the office!”

    This assumes you have the appropriate security clearance associated with the content in the first place.

  6. I notice that this document does not actually order not to view the documents, just not to view them from the AF NIPR net.

  7. I remember taking a TS Stamp on my First Boat (USS John Marshall, SSBN 611) and inking up a few Playboys that were floating around. I placed them on the Mess Deck, grabbed a cup of coffee, and told my Shipmates that only those with a “Need to Know” AND the Clearance could look at them. The poor Junior Strikers thought I was serious! Then the Chief Yeoman walked in, got “That Smile,” called up MY Chief, and guess who was assigned to do the Burn Bags when we pulled back into Guam?

    Of course, nowadays, the mere Presence of a Playboy aboard a Boat would probably send my Ass to the Brig.

  8. Something occurred to me today:
    By treating those documents as classified material, the government is more or less confirming their authenticity.
    Absent this sort of reaction, they could perfectly well be forgeries. After all, anyone with a PC can create documents, slapping a downloaded NSA logo on a Powerpoint presentation is a trivial exercise, and it’s not like the average member of press or public could tell the difference.
    Whatever became of “neither confirm nor deny”?

  9. Tango- 🙂

    SiG- Thanks!

    Eric- True!!! And it’s the same drill that occurred over the Wikileaks stuff…