The results of sequestration continue to bite the Navy in the ass…
The U.S. Navy’s cruiser modernization program has been disorganized in its planning and troubled in its execution, service leaders have told Defense News.
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Seven cruisers were put into a particular variation of the modernization program as part of plans to extend the life of the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers: They’d undergo an initial maintenance availability to modernize areas like the galley; go into a reduced operating status with a skeleton crew of about 35 sailors watching over the ship pierside for several years; go into a one-year availability to prepare for dry docking; and then conduct an “extended dry-docking selected restricted availability” where the bulk of the work would be done.
The first cruiser, Gettysburg, is nearing the end of that process and will go to sea this year, after its 2014 entrance into the service life-extension effort.
Full article, HERE from Defense News.
Note that it has taken EIGHT years to do one ship… The one year avail is now in year THREE, because of the amount of work needed, and lack of planning for systemic integration of the upgrades… Sigh…
What isn’t mentioned is the whole sequestration, “Well, we don’t need cruisers anymore, so we can park them…oh wait, we DO need them. But we can reduce manning to get more maintenance done in port.” Which didn’t happen. What happened was the Navy got behind on basic maintenance due to lack of personnel and reduced budgets, which also impacted the ship availabilities to do upgrades, because operational ‘needs’ kept the ships running ragged.
This not only applied to maintenance, but to crew training… Grrr…
When you look back at the accidents that the Navy has had, most, if not all, can be directly attributed to lack of training in basic functions, like seamanship, ASW, damage control, and upkeep on the ships themselves. When you add in the different modification cycles the ships were on, it became a confusing mess…
And the consolidation/merging of rates into ‘new’ rating pools also caused problems with manning. One example was signalman, sailors who specialized in visual communications, such as flag semaphore, visual morse code, and flag hoist signaling being combined with quartermasters, who specialized in navigation and operations on the bridge and CIC. Now the QM rate has to do ALL of those things. But the senior people who got merged DIDN’T KNOW HOW TO DO THE OTHER RATE’S JOBS! But they got orders without regard to the actual job they were being ordered into…
There are plenty of other horror stories of merged ratings and the problems ships, subs, and air units had as result of all this.
And now we’re in a situation where we need ALL of those ships and subs at sea, and airplanes in the air as a deterrent.
But it’s not going to happen thanks to sequestration and mismanagement at the highest levels.





